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Much work has been done over the last four decades to determine the impact of campaign spending on
election outcomes.  At this point no conclusive result has been reached to tell us that an incumbent’s
spending matters more or less than the candidates challenging them.  But through the course of all this
work no one asked the important question of whether campaign contribution laws impact the amount of
money spent in an election.  In an article titled, “Contribution Limits and Disparity in Contributions between
Gubernatorial Candidates,” Eom and Gross, the first to tackle this topic, concluded that contribution limits do
not significantly impact the difference in spending between candidates running for governor.  Having
several concerns about the validity of their conclusion, I tested their model using more data and more
appropriate assumptions and discovered the model they proposed actually supports the opposite
conclusion.  It appears that laws that limit campaign contributions from corporations decrease the difference
in spending between incumbents and challengers, making elections theoretically more competitive, and
laws that limit campaign contributions from individuals increase that difference, making elections
theoretically less competative.  While more research needs to be done, and this model is not perfect, it is
an important first step into understanding the true impact of laws on elections.
